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Abstract: 
This article applies psychological-sociological accounts of the ‘apophatic’, a 
form of negative thinking, to examples of gaming practices to 
conceptualise a new theory of video game consumption. It challenges the 
prevailing notion that the games consumer is always a ‘cataphatic’ thinker, 
that is, an activistic, rational-pleasure seeker, and looks to the ‘sorrows’ 
(Holbrook, 1993) of gaming to find evidence of its more undesirable 
nature. The term apophatic is characterised as an attempt to de-value the 
rational value purportedly placed on gaming practices. ‘Griefing’ other 
players is a good example of this apophatic ethic; where players derive 
value from the subversion of serious play through the disruption and 
destruction of other players’ game worlds. The struggle with ‘failure’ is 
another. As such, the article concludes with a reflection on the almost 
unsayable nature of videogame consumption, and suggests that consumer 
value may be derived from its more negative, spiritual-like aspects.  
  
 
 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/JOCC
Journal of Consumer Culture
For Peer Review
Acknowledgements 
 
The author would like to express his thanks to the anonymous reviewers who 
helped clarify the ideas presented in this article.   
Page 1 of 20
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/JOCC
Journal of Consumer Culture
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 1
Introduction 
 
Apophasis is a common Greek designation for the language of negativity. Apophasis 
can imply ‘negation’, but its etymology suggests a meaning that characterises it closer 
to ‘un-saying’ or ‘speaking-away’. Apo means ‘from’ or ‘away’. Phasis means 
‘assertion’. Apophasis is thus commonly understood as ‘denial’, and is often paired 
with cataphasis, which means ‘affirmation’ or ‘saying’ (Sells, 1994, p.2).  
 
The aim of this article is to explore the apophatic dimension of videogame 
consumption and to argue that consumers derive value from its more negative 
elements. Few have paid serious attention to the more undesirable aspects of 
videogames, such as the frustration that comes with ‘failure’ (e.g., the experience of 
loss through the death of an avatar) or the hurt that comes from ‘griefing’ (e.g., the 
intentionally harassing or upsetting of another player). I will argue that both of these 
elements of gaming practice appear to resonate with what Brown (1999) calls ‘the 
apophatic ethic and the spirit the postmodern consumer’. The modern consumer is 
seen as someone who derives value from the negation of the rational value 
purportedly attributed to consumer behaviour in favour for its more ‘hellish’ aspects:  
 
‘For every manifestation of the Holy Spirit of Harrods or Hamleys, for every 
moment of extra-sensory bliss brought about by burying one’s head in a 
bucket of Ben and Jerry’s, there are encounters that only Mephistopheles 
himself and his mephitic marketing myrmidons could have concocted. 
Ironically, however, it is these abominable consumer experiences, these 
Stygian shopping torments, these infernal retailing regions, that render the 
pleasurable side of shopping so rapturous, exhilarating, joyous, spiritual – to 
some extent at least. An apophatic dialectic of good and evil, pleasure and 
pain, sacred and profane thus appears to obtain’ (Brown, 1999, p.174).  
 
This dialectic is of concern here also. From its earliest conception, the game consumer 
has been depicted as a rational pleasure-seeker, whose ability to control and play 
videogame environments well has been linked with an affirmative conception of 
enjoyment (Holbrook, et. al. 1982, 1984). Gaming pleasures have been portrayed as 
emerging from the achievement and success that players attribute to their mastery of 
gaming worlds (Grodal, 2000). An idea that is then enshrined in players’ hedonistic 
daydreams and fantasies (Molesworth and Denegri-Knott, 2007) and life-scripts 
(Molesworth, 2009). Indeed, in recent years, it has become popular to talk of games 
as a rational escape from reality (McGonigal, 2011) and as an instrumental attempt to 
take control over the socio-economic risks and uncertainties present in late modern 
life (Molesworth and Watkins, 2014). In each case, videogames are seen to provide 
the consumer with a temporary relief from the disappointments of material reality, as 
it is said that what stimulates consumer desire to play more or newer videogames is 
the drive to overcome these imperfections (also see Campbell, 1987). 
 
This article seeks to offer a new theory of the videogame consumer that moves 
beyond this conception of consumption as a rational, functional choice. Rather, it 
suggests that the games consumer derives value from the deeply conflictual, yet 
nevertheless profound challenges that are presented during play. I will argue that it is 
within the ‘sorrows’ (Holbrook, 1993) of videogaming that the consumer finds ways 
to introspectively connect to inner worlds by way of the elimination of gaming 
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obstacles. To borrow from Nicos Mouzelis (2010), I argue that apophatic aspects of 
human reflexivity emerge as the consumer reflects on the struggles of gameplay. This 
has the effect of orientating human cognition away from the logico-deductive 
reasoning of rational choice towards more open-ended self-self and self-other 
relations. What this means is that the motivation to consume videogames is not solely 
instrumental, which requires an overly activistic conception of the human subject. On 
the contrary, what I will argue is that the videogame consumer mobilises a more 
‘passive observer-observed’ mode of human reflexivity as they come to reflect on the 
meaning of their failures. This mode relies on the suspension of instrumental thinking 
and is seen to open up a space for players to connect more deeply to their gaming 
projects in both psychological and sociological ways.  
To begin, I will consider sociological accounts of the apophatic, and I will reflect on 
its importance to theorising consumer behaviour. From this perspective, theories of 
the games consumer have tended to emphasise the cataphatic, that is, rational 
dimension of human behaviour. I will suggest that this position obscures the creative 
acts that emerge from the volatile nature of play, and that an understanding of its 
darker side yields a need to embrace the introspective, perhaps even spiritual side, of 
videogame consumption. 
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Videogaming: Pleasure through Control? 
 
The power of play over human psychology is well documented historically. Studies 
have argued that play is an overwhelmingly pleasurable experience (Deci, 1975). Play 
is understood to be autotelic: an intrinsically motivated behavior, which rewards 
people with an internal state of satisfaction and positive affect. When people play, 
they describe their playful experiences in terms of ‘interest’, ‘excitement’, 
‘enjoyment’, and perhaps most importantly, ‘pleasure’ (Calder and Staw, 1975). A 
focus on these internal states has led to the phenomenological conceptualisation of 
play as a site for ‘fun’ (Lewis, 1982) and ‘leisure’ (Neulinger, 1981) as well as a site 
for ‘flow’ (Csikzentmihalyi 1975): a state of mind where the player is happy and in 
control.  
 
This understanding of play has had a noticeable influence on consumer research into 
videogames, which suggests that consumer behavior is driven by these positive 
affective experiences (Holbrook et al., 1984; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982). People 
feel good playing videogames, and it is the ‘experiential’ and ‘hedonistic’ side of 
consumer behavior that drives its consumption. One popular example of this is the 
pleasure that players derive from taking control over videogame environments. For 
example, Grodal (2000, p.211-212) argues that, 
 
‘Interactive media like video games create a further sophistication of media 
consumption by enabling consumers to switch between passive control of their 
emotional and cognitive states (by actively selecting one-way media) and an 
active control of these states (by choosing interactive media)’.  
 
As such, videogames provide a way for people to take control over their moods and 
emotions, and derive satisfaction from the stimulation that comes with playing 
videogames well (also see Holbrook et al., 1984).  
 
In recent years, this understanding of videogame consumption has been elaborated on 
to take account for the modern ‘credo’ of consumerism, perhaps the most significant 
contribution of which has come from the sociologist Colin Campbell (1987). 
According to Campbell, the desire for pleasure, as opposed to utilitarian need 
fulfillment, was driven by a disparity between imaginative anticipation of goods and 
the imperfect reality of consumer experiences. Disappointment with material reality 
propels a self-perpetuating desire for consumer experiences, which offers only 
momentary pleasure. As such, consumer research on videogames has tended to focus 
on the ways that players purchase and play videogames to help them actualize a sense 
of control over their lives (albeit momentarily). For example, Molesworth and 
Denegri-Knott (2007) have argued that videogame consumers use virtual collectable 
items as a way to control, order and make-sense of the ‘liminality’ in their lives. Here, 
videogames are said to be a resource for the scheduling of life-scripts, which provide 
players with the materials required to construct fantasies and daydreams about living 
better lives. Players use videogames not only to escape from routine (see Molesworth, 
2009) but also to actualize a sense of progress in late modern life (see Molesworth 
and Watkins, 2014).  
 
This perspective is built on a wider understanding that videogaming manipulates 
players into consuming products that facilitate the experiences of control, which they 
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cannot get from material culture today. For example, Kirkpatrick (2013) has argued 
that videogame consumption is built on a wider rejection of material culture or, at 
least, a re-negotiation of its failures. These failures come in a particular form: that the 
modern world no longer offers rewarding work or the fulfilling of life opportunities 
needed to give people a sense of meaning. As such, the consumption of videogames 
provides a way to recuperate for this sense of loss by providing players with a means 
to ascertain a form of achievement and success that is rich in status symbolism. What 
emerges is evidence of players ‘happy’ to spend hours undertaking repetitive gaming 
acts, which is not only considered tantamount to the addictive nature of videogames, 
but also a means through which (the illusion of) control is said to temporarily remedy 
such liminal anxieties (Goggin, 2008).  
 
The theme of control is not unique to theories of videogame consumption or 
consumer culture however. Mouzelis (2010) suggests that the idea of control is central 
to whole ‘Western way’ of thinking about reflexivity and the human subject. 
Mouzelis calls it ‘cataphatic reflexivity’, and in his critique of European social theory, 
he argues that many prominent sociologists fall into the trap of conceptualising 
human subjectivity in terms of rational, instrumental action. Mouzelis’ critique is 
broadly aimed at the ‘reflexive modernisation thesis’ of Beck, Giddens and Lasch 
(1994). Mouzelis is critical of their idea that the human subject is always seeking to 
rationally control and construct their biographies. For Mouzelis, our understanding of 
reflexivity and self-identity should not be limited to the notion that one seeks to take 
(biographical) control over the risks and uncertainties of late modern life. Such a 
position obscures the apophatic dimension of subjectivity, which is common to 
anyone who has thought reflectively about themselves and the challenges that they 
face. Mouzelis (2010, p.273) captures the ‘apophatic’ in the following way:  
 
‘An apophatic manner of turning inwards is another way of navigating in post-
traditional settings. In ideal-type terms, in this case, the turning inwards aims 
not at doing but undoing, not at constructing but deconstructing. It aims at 
weakening rather than enhancing the rationalizing, calculating, planning 
dimensions of the self-self relationship. It focuses less on purposive decision-
making processes and more on getting rid of the ‘tyranny of purposiveness’ 
[…] The same is true about identity formation. Identities are neither ascriptive 
nor cataphatically constructed. They emerge apophatically and so does the 
way they relate to each other’. 
 
The apophatic is not about control, on the contrary, it is an attempt to negate 
instrumental rationality, and thereby shift away from cognition towards an 
exploratory, open-ended voyage that brings the subject closer to their inner world. In 
more secular terms, apophatic reflexivity is about finding a way to actualise the 
existential importance of introspection: an inward looking movement that offers a 
creative and dynamic widening of self-identity through feeling, rather than control 
and knowledge (also see Halton, 1995).  
 
Such a perspective has been applied to consumer culture, though only very rarely. For 
example, Stephen Brown (1999, p.164), in his critique of Holbrook’s ‘Typology of 
Consumer Value’, suggests that consumer behaviour is built on the very negation of 
what is often construed as ‘valuable ‘through cataphatic reasoning. To try and take 
control of consumer value by defining what constitutes ‘Quality’, ‘Beauty’, ‘Fun’, or 
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‘Moral’ provides the very conditions of possibility for its re-evaluation via negativa 
and this may be understood as a deeply introspective process. From this perspective, 
consumption is imbued with a spiritual framing (see Lasch, 1979), which is derived 
from the seemingly transcendental nature of consumer encounters. Brown (1999, 
p.176) describes this nature as ‘blasphemous buying’, and it refers to the more 
‘hellish’, almost purgatorial occurrences, which are an integral but nevertheless 
overlooked part of the consumer experience. It is our doubts, anxieties, tests, torments 
and temptations that supplicate our convictions and augment our commitments to 
consumer products.  
 
To align Brown and Mouzelis then, what we see is that the motivation to consume is 
not strictly cataphatic, that is to say, an activistic attempt to derive pleasure from 
(momentary) episodes of control. On the contrary, to consume is also to turn inwards 
in a negatory fashion and passively-observe the false expectation that the object will 
deliver, thus eliminating it, whilst simultaneously bringing us closer to it. In other 
words, in this self-self relation, the consumption of the object is not about closure; it 
is not an attempt to achieve a goal. Rather, its negation prompts an open-ended 
dialogue with the self, which involves an ever-deepening, more intense cycle of 
introspection. Importantly, it is through this cycle that more spontaneous modes of 
being and acting in the world can emerge as we further examine others and ourselves 
via negativa. Both Brown and Mouzelis suggest that there is something profoundly 
spiritual in this process, for it is not an emergent property of rational thinking, but 
rather it is arrived at ‘only through the seriousness, the pain, the patience and the 
labour of the negative’ (Brown, 1999, p.165-166). In other words, it is our consumer 
abjection that puts us in touch with others and ourselves in ways deeper than that of 
the pleasure derived from control.   
 
It is based on this understanding of consumer value that I seek to question the idea 
that the nature of videogame consumption can be explained only in terms of the 
pleasures derived from control. In the next section of this article, I will suggest that a 
reading of failure (as a loss of control) is important to understanding the apophatic 
value derived from the games consumer experience.  
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Apophatic Consumption: Failure in Videogames 
 
An exploration of the apophatic raises an important question with regards to the abject 
nature of videogame consumption: is failure a valuable consumer experience and, if 
so, why?  
 
Games designer and researcher Jesper Juul (2013) argues that failure is one of the 
great paradoxes of videogaming – we may dislike failing in games but we dislike not 
failing even more. Indeed, it has long been acknowledged that the principle appeal of 
playing games is completing fair and challenging puzzles (Danesi, 2002). The more 
peculiar the puzzle, and the more uncertain its solution, the more we lose ourselves in 
trying to find its patterns and avoid its tricks – what the game designer might call 
‘good balancing’ (also see Juul, 2011). Consider, for example, what it means to 
successfully complete a level in Sonic the Hedgehog: the player must be able to 
traverse the platform environment by avoiding the various hazards and traps that will 
kill Sonic. Failure to do so informs the player of a wrongdoing – Sonic has to survive 
to the end of the level – and the level is restarted to offer the player another 
opportunity.  From this perspective, failure is said to motivate gameplay as it informs 
the player of whether or not they have solved the puzzle correctly, thereby acting as 
an obstacle to be rationally overcome, i.e., ‘I will avoid jumping into that hole in the 
ground next time’.  
 
I would suggest that there is an apophatic dimension to this act that has been 
overlooked. The appeal of failing in games reaches beyond this logical way to resolve 
a given puzzle. Indeed, we like failing in games because, like with other areas of 
consumption, we derive value from the emotional turmoil that accompanies it (also 
see Holbrook, 1993). In particular, I would suggest that Hegel’s notion of ‘the labour 
of the negative’, adopted by Brown (1999), encapsulates this dimension: that one 
derives a sense of authenticity through the pain and seriousness that comes with 
failing in an antagonistic game world. The question is to understand how failures in 
videogames facilitate such abject experiences, and the psychological and sociological 
manner in which value is derived from them.   
 
Generally speaking, the apophatic dimension of videogame consumption is built on 
two accepted assumptions within game studies. First, players have ‘active 
conversations’ (see Bogost, 2008) with the boundaries that videogames construct, 
including other players who play, e.g., in the case of online gaming. Second, these 
boundaries are designed to grant players the freedom from consequences. We like 
videogames despite acknowledging that we will fail, perhaps on many occasions. This 
is because games allow us to deny their judgment on our behavior. For example, we 
recognise that they are artificial designs that have been created to make players 
experience failure. Sometimes this fallacy is compounded with numerous bugs, 
glitches and the generally accepted issues of rendering, at least graphically, within a 
videogame (Juul, 2011).  
 
These assumptions are important for understanding how games provide a way for 
players to plausibly deny the negative experiences that are derived from the failure of 
in-game performances. We can blame the game, we can blame a team-mate, we can 
even blame ourselves, but in a way that is cognizant, and perhaps even accepts, the 
pseudo-illusionary nature of the environment within which we are immersed. I stress 
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the pseudo-part because it is this very ambiguity in play (see Sutton-Smith, 1997) that 
allows us to navigate failure in a way that makes it valuable. 
 
Importantly, it is the intra-active relation that players establish with a videogame that 
makes it valuable. This is only possible because it relieves the player of a sense of 
agency. Players must forego a sense of control in recognizing that what is presented 
before them is designed (to varying degrees) to determine their behavior. They 
embrace the fact that the environment is a pre-designed unknown and a special set of 
rules and actions that circumscribe their capacity to play. For example, in order to win 
at Sonic the Hedgehog, I must accept the bounded control of the environment’s 
physics engine, which circumscribes how fast I can run, jump and bounce. Similarly, I 
must accept that the levels progress in a sequential order and that I cannot know all 
the tricks and traps of each level before I play. To borrow from Mouzelis (2010, 
p.274), it is this very suspension of instrumental thought that facilitates the deeply 
personal connection that I have with the game. It is only through the delegating of a 
sense of my agency over to the gaming environment that I can initiate a ‘passive 
observer-observed’ mode of reflexivity. This mode is not concerned with mastering 
the puzzle viz. logico-deductive reasoning, but rather establishing a sense of trust that 
I can have in the game as it guides me through its design (see Koster, 2013). Again, 
this is an intra-active relation because it emerges spontaneously as I entrust myself to 
the game’s play mechanics. Thus, as I voyage through the levels of Sonic the 
Hedgehog, I am engaged in two active dialogues: I seek not only to negate its 
obstacles – to avoid its hazards – but also I recognise that failure is never the end. I 
trust that I can always return and start over. This relation acquires permanence and 
solidity so long as I understand what it is to fail, that is to say that the game does not 
change its rules, and as such I can derive value in acceptance of the game’s eternal 
recurrence. In other words, my anger at the death of my avatar only turns me inwards 
as I entrust to the game the experience of what Holbrook (1993, p.157) terms the 
‘rhetoric of rebirth’: ‘the joy lost through sorrow to joy regained’. 
 
Tragic Gaming 
That players are cognizant of the fact that they are playing within a special set of rules 
is key to understanding the abject value that consumers derive from playing 
videogames: videogames are mediums that provide a (relatively) safe space where 
players can experience tragic emotions.  
 
Juul (2013, p.108-110) draws this out most clearly in his analysis of tragedy in games 
but the key point is that it is only possible because we feel able to relieve ourselves of 
a sense of responsibility for the characters involved (including the one we control) 
that we can experience of tragedy. He suggests that tragedy in games would not be 
possible otherwise – after all who would want to take control of Anne Frank and Anna 
Karenina without a clear sense of being relieved of responsibility? The irony for Juul 
is that players would probably take on these roles but that this would necessarily 
involve a kind of self-abnegation – much like watching Patrick Bateman in Mary 
Harron’s film American Psycho; we distance ourselves from the atrocious murders he 
commits but we recognize the strategy behind how he hides the bodies as 
uncomfortable as this might be. The same is true of playing video games: when we 
fail we must acknowledge that we are ineffectual in some way. Such a feeling is self-
abnegating, and yet we subject ourselves to it anyway because we trust in the 
possibility that there is a fair chance we might redeem ourselves.  
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To extend Juul’s analysis, I would argue that such feelings have a psychoanalytic 
framing that contain strong apophatic elements. The relationship between apophatic 
theory and psychoanalysis is well documented elsewhere (see Henderson, 2013), but 
it is worth noting that both theories emphasize the idea that an individual finds it 
deeply therapeutic to find and achieve goals on their own terms. The purpose of the 
analyst is not to suggest goals to the patient, but rather to have the patient become 
aware of those goals, in their own time, and eliminate them accordingly. What is said 
to emerge is an expression of self that is not imposed from the outside (i.e., by the 
analyst or the game) but rather as an intra-active relation that develops spontaneously 
from within the subject’s inner world. This connection adds a layer of meaning to 
play that logico-deductive reasoning cannot, for it allows the player to experience 
emotional vulnerabilities, including fear, anger, sadness, and shock (see Sutton-Smith, 
2003).  
 
Consider, for example, the feelings of anger that accompany losing three or fours 
hours worth of gameplay. This is a very real possibility in the one of the most 
critically acclaimed, yet difficult, videogames ever produced: Dark Souls. Produced 
by Hidetaka Miyazaki, this action role-playing videogame is largely celebrated for the 
manner in which it subjects its players to combat encounters that often result in the 
experience of death and defeat. Internet commentary, including reviews and forum 
discussions, salute the game’s ruthless nature: players who fail to proceed with 
extreme caution, learn from past mistakes, or find alternative routes to explore, will 
die. Indeed, ‘you died’ is the game’s most infamous screen image as players find 
themselves time-again victim of the game’s clever programming system. For in Dark 
Souls, enemy and boss battles are purposively designed to trick players into thinking 
that they have mastered their combatants’ techniques. Players will spend hours 
cautiously learning how to defeat a single boss or a group of enemies only for the 
programming to change fighting style and to catch them off-guard. The result is death, 
and the player will be set back, often quite substantially, and asked to run the gauntlet 
again as if new.  
 
Understandably, the prospect of losing hours of gameplay is rarely considered a 
pleasant experience in Dark Souls. And yet, it might be suggested that it is these 
cycles of struggle-death-rebirth that make it such a critical success. As one reviewer 
of the game suggests, ‘Trying, failing, trying again, failing again – Dark Souls is an 
ongoing process of skin hardening, of toughening up… [it] intrinsically recognizes 
the importance of failing. You died. But you are back. You failed. But you can try 
again’ (see Smith, 2016). Death makes for a good teacher in Dark Souls. It helps 
players transform the experience of failure into something therapeutic: a valuable 
lesson. Consider how the same reviewer reflects on the experience of death as 
analogous to his own neuroses:  
 
‘By the end of Dark Souls, I felt as if I had matured […] I couldn’t handle 
failure. And I don’t mean failure as in professional failure, or even perceptible 
failure – if I so much as spilled a drink, or spent what I thought was too long 
getting ready in the morning, I would deteriorate into self-loathing. I might 
argue that Dark Souls mirrors what was once was my mental state […] There 
were times, plenty in fact, when Dark Souls drove me to despair. It made me 
hate myself, scream at myself, hurt myself for being a failure – but maturity 
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begins with confrontation. And contrary to its reputation, Dark Souls, for 
somebody acutely sensitive to personal or perceived failure, is immensely 
reassuring. By the end, I understood that making mistakes was not just 
acceptable, it was essential’. 
 
This description clarifies the apophatic dimension of videogame consumption: it 
shows that a player who connects intra-actively to the abject experience of failure 
(through death) may derive a deep personal connection with this videogame. Dark 
Souls helps the player set his own goals, which he strives towards on his own terms; 
what emerges (within this sandbox environment) is a spontaneous expression of his 
will to eliminate challenging obstacles. This experience opens up the player to 
emotional vulnerability, which he observes and reflects on, informing how the game 
shapes his sense of self. What makes Dark Souls a critical success is that its cycles of 
struggle-death-and-rebirth help this player to reveal a personal tragedy (see Nietzsche, 
1872 [1993]) – his neuroses. The game is experienced as a tragic drama, and rather 
than furthering the player’s nihilism or obsession with rational control it becomes a 
means of confronting it and bringing it into check. Through fear, anger and sadness, 
the player comes to disclose a truth to themselves: that mistakes are not moments for 
mortification and self-flagellation but rather are an important, constructive, and 
necessary aspect of the human condition. 
 
By way of the annihilation of th ir avatars, videogames offer the consumer remedial 
experiences that can help them confront their emotional insecurities. In the remaining 
section of this article, I want to further clarify this point through an analysis of the 
apophatic dimension of ‘dark play’. In considering some of the most conflictual and 
perhaps upsetting gaming experiences around, I intend to show how laughter emerges 
as a cathartic and transgressive act that is important for establishing meaningful social 
relationships.   
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The Funny Side of ‘Dark Play’  
 
The philosopher of play Miguel Sicart (2014, p.9-10) argues that one of the defining 
characteristics of play is that its pleasures are derived from a central tension between 
‘taking control’ and ‘letting go’: 
 
‘Play is always dangerous, dabbling with risks, creating and destroying, and 
keeping a careful balance between both. Play is between the rational pleasures 
of order and creation and the sweeping euphoria of destruction and rebirth, 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysiac’. 
 
Here, Sicart too makes reference to Nietzsche’s (1872 [1993]) The Birth of Tragedy to 
suggest that central to the human psyche is a battle between rationality and 
irrationality. For Nietzsche, tragedy sums up the colliding tensions of Ancient Greek 
culture: between the order and sobriety of the Apollonian and the embodied, 
passionate, irrational, and irreverent Dionysiac art. Nietzsche considered how the 
genre of Greek tragedy effectively merged the two, allowing artists to move between 
both. Sicart (2014, p.9) argues that through play people find a way to navigate the 
Apollonian and Dionysiac tendencies in the human psyche (also see Caillois, 2001). 
He characterises this struggle in the following way: ‘not only with the obstacles and 
needs that play imposes on us, but also with the permanent temptations that happen in 
play’. In other words, when we play, we often find it tempting to break the rules or 
corrupt the very values appropriated to the playful context within which we reside. An 
example of this can be seen in Lego, we often find ourselves building things without 
the need for any plans or instructions – what Caillois (2001) refers to as the ‘formal’ 
or ‘intrinsic’ qualities of play. This is what makes it enchanting: it allows us to let go 
of the elements of rationality that typically structure our decision-making processes. 
We can even be reckless: building elaborate constructions only to make them 
unsteady and watch them as they are destroyed. Indeed, when we play in this manner, 
we can find that something very powerful emerges from the process of balancing 
(dis)order: laughter.  
 
Laughter as freedom 
Perhaps it seems odd to discuss laughter in an article about the negative experiences 
of videogaming, but for the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) laughter has 
a deep spiritual meaning that often emerges in dark times. He considers laughter to be 
one of the fundamental forms of truth concerning human nature, and suggests that 
certain aspects of the world are only accessible to laughter. One of these aspects is 
liberation: to laugh is to liberate oneself from external and internal censorship. It 
liberates us from prohibition and inhibition alike. Laughter is said to unveil within us 
a sense of renewal, one that leads us to reflect on the fallacy of seriousness itself. For 
Bakhtin, such liberation was encapsulated within the play activities found within the 
Carnival. Play was said to be an example of a ‘carnivalesque activity’: a way for 
people to express themselves by challenging the rational structures or institutions 
within which they operate. Humor or satire, key to the carnival, provided a way for 
people to open up a space for freedom, and this would be expressed through laughter. 
Carnivals were seen as ways of temporarily dismissing the oppressive forces of 
established rationality, and facilitating a space where people could be critical of the 
world in a deeply embodied way: people would laugh and hurt at the same time. 
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Carnivals were not spaces of fun but, rather, catharsis; they functioned to provide a 
space to purify the soul through ambivalent laughter, and to provide a ritual that could 
supplant religious austerity. As such, laughter is at its most powerful when it takes on 
an intra-active form of truth: when it gets the subject to question his or herself and 
their relationship to nature and/or other people.  
 
Videogames are spaces filled with laughter. But to understand why, one needs to 
move beyond the widespread assumption that videogaming is a ‘normatively positive’ 
and voluntary experience (Malaby, 2007). Indeed, such an assumption obscures the 
dark and playful attitude that often penetrates the formal design of games, opening 
them up to carnivalesque activity. For example, Mäyra (2015) talks of ‘dark play’ as 
an approach to play situations in which one finds anarchic pleasure in the breaking, 
smashing and failure of gameplay. Through examples of Lego Star Wars and Lego: 
The Lord of the Rings, Mäyra argues that laughter may be commonly associated with 
the tragedy of failure and (more broadly) the ‘playful destruction’ found in videogame 
environments: children are often found excitedly demolishing in-game surroundings, 
or laughing at the humorous tragedies that befall Lego characters. Under the control 
of children, Lego-characters appear to die under the most calamitous of 
circumstances, argues Mäyra (2015, p.95), and these episodes of dark play are said to 
demonstrate, ‘how the ambiguities of power and transgression in play are intertwined 
in complex renegotiations of (active or passive) agency and of new realities generated 
in play’. In other words, videogames provide children with the space to let go of the 
seriousness of the very subject material presented, and thereby explore the morality of 
violence and death through the laughter that accompanies failure. This relieves them 
of (some of) the agency that life and death decisions bring, whilst also introducing 
them to the funny side of our controlling, existential being.  
 
Griefing ‘for the lulz’ 
Conceivably a more extreme example of this is ‘griefing’ (or ‘trolling’), where a 
player intentionally ruins the gameplay experiences of another ‘for the lulz’ 
(laughter). Griefing is commonly defined in the negative. For example, Warner and 
Raiter (2005, p.45) argue that griefing is the ‘intentional harassment of other players’ 
through the utilisation of game structures or physics ‘in unintended ways to cause 
distress for other players’. Chesney et al., (2009) suggest that the practice is common 
within online worlds, such as Second Life, where griefers proceed to play games to 
make trouble and irritate others. Some examples include:  
 
• Entering a player-owned house or establishment and blocking entrances/exists, 
thereby delaying the gameplay of others.  
• Spamming the in-game chat with vulgar and obscene language or symbolism. 
• Hacking accounts, crashing servers and orchestrating large in-game events 
that subvert the control and restrictions of the game players and server 
administrators.  
 
Understandably, those on the receiving end of this kind of play tend to find it, at least 
to begin with, emotionally upsetting. The imposition of having one’s hard earned 
efforts destroyed or tainted is souring to say the least. It prompts us to question the 
time and effort we’ve put in, only to have our project(s) miscarry. Foo and Koivisto 
(2004) suggest that victims of griefing often dismiss the activity as a simple 
maleficent attempt to frustrate and harm other players. Indeed, it is said that griefers’ 
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actions are pointless and have no intrinsic value – why, after all, would anyone seek 
to subvert the structures of rationality and control designed into the game? 
 
A more nuanced perspective would appreciate the apophatic character of griefing, and 
suggest that it is an example of how players will turn the serious treatment of 
gameplay ‘on its head’ to find another layer of meaning (also see Schrank and Bolter, 
2014). Bakioglu’s (2009) analysis of ‘Goon Culture’ in Second Life resonates strongly 
with this. Bakioglu argues that the origins of griefing in online videogames can be 
traced back to web forums that were orientated towards subverting the use of the 
Internet for serious business. ‘Goons’ were videogame players who would object to 
the serious treatment of videogame play through their creative and disruptive 
gameplay styles. This would include attacking players, hacking accounts and crashing 
services ‘for the lulz’. Griefers find it funny telling and showing others that they 
should not take this videogame too seriously. Indeed, O’Brien (2010) argues that 
griefing in Second Life is an example of ‘theatrical play’: it threatens the authenticity 
of the immersive environment precisely to prompt users to contemplate the value that 
they attribute to it. From this perspective, griefing negates the seriousness with which 
people immerse themselves within these worlds. It is a transgressive act; a cheap shot, 
perhaps, but one which is conducted in order to elicit a laugh and open up a space for 
frivolity, which can bring griefers and victims into emotional contact with one 
another.  
 
The idea that victims of griefing may find it funny should not be so alien. As with an 
apophatic account of failure, players may find griefing confrontational, yes, but it is 
also therapeutic to have the veil of control lifted from one’s eyes. There is a humorous 
sense of relief in accepting that one’s effort to control things has been annulled. The 
Slovenian philosopher of comedy Alenka Zupančič (2008, p.143) captures this point 
when she discusses politically incorrect jokes: these jokes should cause a kind of 
‘existential anxiety’ but instead a ‘certain amount of pleasure gets realized and makes 
it possible for us to laugh also in [sic] face of its discomforting dimension’. To have 
one’s gaming efforts ridiculed or attacked operates in a similar manner: it confronts 
the player by exposing the arrogant pretentions of their arbitrarily created order(s).  
Like failure, griefing has a remedial capacity then: it creates the conditions of 
possibility for players to turn inwards (intra-actively) and find humility in the funny 
side of dark play.  
 
Importantly, such experiences are not only psychological in character, for laughing at 
one’s own or another player’s misfortune is also a ‘social performance’, which can 
bind players together within a group or larger community (Goffman, 1967). For 
example, Conway (2013) argues that laughter, whilst cathartic, is also an important 
part of any video gamer’s communicative apparatus. Laughter is a point of 
socialization that can give players license to engage in conversation, perhaps even 
with complete strangers. Laughter is said to be an example of how ‘phatic interaction’ 
(2013, p.22) emerges within gaming communities: a player will use laughter in order 
to confirm their own reaction to a particular incident by way of conferencing with 
another that they are ‘on the same page’. As such, it may be suggested that players 
embrace the hostility of the carnivalesque as a way of establishing inter-active cues 
that can foster social cohesion.  
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Consider, for example, the kinds of ‘grief play’ found in pre-match lobbies of online 
first-person shooters, like Call of Duty (see Meades, 2015b, p.65-68). Trash talking, 
ridicule, and ritualistic laughter are all examples of the social cues that operate 
apophatically in this space– they negate the terms of service because their 
manifestations are found to be offensive, problematic and abject. And yet, they are 
also social cues that validate members of the group as ‘normal’. Ridiculing someone 
for a tragic kill-death ratio/score in Call of Duty is a rite of passage, which players 
recognise as part of acting appropriately within the game’s frame. By laughing at a 
poor score, players are given license to ‘laugh it off’: to remedy the disappointing 
play experience and the tense social situation that may follow. Laughter ‘breaks the 
ice’ of playing poorly, and sees players acknowledge to one another that ‘mistakes 
happen’, or that it is ‘just a game’. These cues are important for experiencing a sense 
of social cohesion within online gaming environments, particularly as laughter 
operates to lessen social responsibility.  
 
In closing, I would suggest that there is a role in videogame consumption for the 
Jester as well as Master – the licensed fool whose inappropriate behavior confronts 
and keeps in check the seriousness with which other players treat the game. In making 
jokes, and playing incorrectly, the Jester can become an accepted part of a player’s 
social performance. They ridicule but also laugh at their own efforts in an attempt to 
subvert the instrumental structures that typically characterize ‘playing well’ (see 
Kirkpatrick, 2013; also Meades, 2015b). From this perspective, the Jester is an 
apophatic character: someone whose mischievous and risky behavior is acknowledged 
(perhaps even celebrated) as a way to invite players to think intra-actively about their 
gaming practices. Thus, the fool who kills himself and his teammates in calamitous 
ways (e.g., by throwing a poorly-timed grenade out of a closing elevator) sets fourth 
the possibility for all those involved to become a little bit closer: to laugh and 
recognise that there is more to gaming than rational control.   
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Conclusion 
 
By referring to psychological and sociological accounts of the ‘apophatic’, a form of 
negative thinking, and applying this to examples of gaming practices, I have tried to 
show that videogame consumption is not only motivated by affirmative pleasures, but 
is negatory in the form that it takes. This culminates in a new theory of the videogame 
consumer that is built on the following assumptions: 
 
1. The consumer connects with videogames in both intra-active (self-self) and 
inter-active (self-other) terms. In the cataphatic case, the consumer connects 
with the game in an activistic manner as an object to be instrumentally 
overcome. In the apophatic case, the consumer connects with gameplay as an 
open-ended voyage to be observed and commented on passively. The latter is 
important because it opens up consumer studies to helping explain the more 
‘hellish’ aspects of gameplay, particularly the appeal of ‘playing darkly’ 
(Meades, 2015b, Mortensen, et al. 2015). 
2. Playing a videogame is often an unknown and uncertain experience. One’s 
perception of what is controllable is contingent upon our interactions with the 
design of the game and other players. As such, videogames should be 
understood as oblique (Kay, 2011) environments that are premised on a player 
‘mucking through’ disappointment, failure and frustration. As such, 
videogame consumption may be driven by not getting what one is looking for 
as opposed to a pre-conceived notion of self-realisation/self-actualization. 
What is perhaps spiritual about playing video games is that consumers may 
derive a sense of (self-) knowledge and expression from the process of 
negating previously unknown obstacles established through their gaming 
journey. 
3. From this perspective, a discussion of the apophatic allows us to acknowledge 
that consumers can connect with themselves and others on a level beyond 
means-ends thinking. This provides mutual grounds for the recognition of 
what Brown (1999) calls ‘the labouring of the negative’ in consumer value –
that players credit one another with expressions of solidarity that emerge from 
the most frustrating, perhaps even hurtful aspects of their consumption. 
Psychoanalysis helps us understand the intra-active aspects of this 
consumption as a remedial catharsis built on a relational trust between the 
player and the game. Symbolic interactionism helps us understand the inter-
active aspects of this consumption as a social performance built on open-
ended phatic interactions that prompt social solidarity and (a momentary) 
critical stance towards the seriousness of playing well.  
 
Each of these points captures the tensions that characterise videogame consumption: 
between the cataphatic and apophatic, affirmation and denial, winning and losing, 
pleasure and pain, sadness and laughter, control and letting go. As such, videogaming 
may be considered an example of what Bateson, et al., (1956) terms the ‘double-
bind’: a somatic practice that carries conflicting messages that result in an 
emotionally charged dilemma. Such dilemmas are evident in players’ deep intra- and 
inter-personal struggles with the possibility of defeat. Interestingly, Bateson noted 
that there was a spiritual dimension to this dilemma, as in attempting to transcend the 
constraints of its dualism, subjects would recognise the impermanent nature of their 
reality. This article has shown that videogame consumers may too experience such 
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transcendence. Videogames offer them a sense of redemption through the annihilation 
and re-birth of their avatars. That such deliverance is possible speaks to the 
contradictory manner in which players experience and value the desire for dis (order). 
That games consumption is an act of negative labouring, and that one may derive 
spiritual meaning from its black magic, points to its tragic and yet alluring quality.  
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